34 CONFIDENTIAL Classification Action Date Sent: FIIR FROM: USITISSION BERLIN Rec'd: Info Secretary of GLAZE TO: RMR Amorbessy Bonn G-83 SS RPID INFO: Paris (Also pass CINCEUR Thurston & West) (via pouch) W London (wie pouch) G Moscow (win pouch) SP POIAD USARBUR (via pouch) С INR Rof; Berlin's 316 to Bonn, rptd SecState 364 Н Р UOP Brandt told CBS correspondent Daniel Schorr in recent interview for background only that he expects some action against West Berlin by end May (1) IRC possibly complete sealing off of Sector-SovZone and Sector-Sector borders but without blockeds. This would suspend even present meager traffic of OCB 0 East and Wost Germans, tourists and others between West Berlin and city's IV USTA Mast Sector and surrounding Soviet Zone, leaving open only access routes IV CIA between Berlin and FedRep. Brandt told Schorr he is giving thought to OSD possible countermeasures to be taken if sealing off materializes, such as ARMY appeal to Sowlone population offer passive resistance through strikes or NAVY work slowlows. When Schorr saked if in light Hungarian experience this might not unintentionally turn into more active registance as in June 1953 AIR with attendant dangers. Brandt said that this was serious consideration Ü that would have to be taken into eccount, J

> I took savantage of Brandt's reference this subject in conversation of sucial occasion to ask how what he characterized se "weepon of strikes and) work slowdowns or other passive registence measures" could be used against Soviets and Pankov government in Soviet Zone without danger of leading populace there believe that action by them would be supported from the West or otherwise encouraging them perhaps to go too far. Hayor said the he roalised this presented very difficult problem. He is aware that direct expense to Soviet Zone inhabitants might lead them believe that support from West would be forthcoming and cause them go too far in hope of such support with result that the action could work out ultimately to the disadvantage of West rather than of Soviets. He indicated belief that this problem could be solved by swoiding direct appeals to populace. Instead he would point out to Pankow end the Soviets through radio and other publish channels that they are vulnerable to measures such as he has in mind. He believes that if public warnings are made to the Soviets regarding the ways in which they are vulnerable and the ways in which trouble can be made for them at minimum risks to the troublemakers, persons in the Soviet

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Zone might take the hint and make use of the techniques cutlined without going too far. I expressed interest in his ideas but suggested that such a company against the Soviets might be hard to direct and particularly to keep in belance merely by radio and public channels. He indicated averages of this circumstance and said that the matter would have to be given such further thought and careful planning before any actual actions were undertaken.

At time Bungarian uprising, Berlin DGB Chairman Schernowski attempted make redio appeal to Sovione for sympathy strike along lines now englaged by Brant, but was stopped by city government authorities fearful of providing uprising, Schernowski at that time argued unsuccessfully that after 1973 experience Sovione population could be relied upon not to exceed passive resistance. Apparently without knowledge Brandt's present thinking, Schernowski recently informed Mission officer be believes appeal for passive resistance in Sovione would be affective countermeasures if West Barlin sealed off from surrounding areas without blockeds.

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AUTH: F BURNB, JR.

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